A good deal of digital ink is spilled on these pages in the cause of evidence-based programs. But not much verbiage is spent on the cause of doing good things better. Today, we look at Taiichi Ohno’s inauspiciously titled but nonetheless thrilling Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production, and hope that a few words about this slight tome helps right the balance.

Taiichi Ohno started working at Toyota soon after the Second World War. At the time, Toyota was primarily a sewing machine manufacturer. There has been no rigorous experiment on Ohno’s work and methods. But the results speak for themselves. Despite the woes it suffered last year, Toyota is now the world’s largest producer of cars.

Evidence based programs are born from science. They focus on causal pathways and outcomes. The Toyota Production System, on the other hand, is the product of the trial and error of an attentive management team. They were seeking a way to make a sewing machine or car better, faster, and cheaper.

To the scientific ear, some of Ohno’s theories from the book, first published in 1988, might sound like eastern philosophy or well-meaning but empty platitudes. Core concepts include hansei, meaning relentless reflection about how to do something better; kaizen means a determined focus on continuous improvement. Nemawashi is the process of bringing people together to reflect on what works, what went wrong and how to put it right. When looked at closely, every idea in Ohno’s work is underpinned by the kind of discipline that scientists love.

In Toyota, if the production line breaks down, it stops. The workers gather around the faulty section, discuss how to solve the difficulty and take responsibility for both implementing that solution and evaluating its effectiveness. Far better, says Ohno, to take time to make the most of the views of the people who are responsible for getting a job done, rather than implementing a solution thought up by someone who isn’t on the production line.

The most revolutionary of Ohno’s developments is the Just in Time concept. In Detroit, at the factories that Ohno visited and learned from, cars were massed produced and parked on lots until a customer came along to buy it. At Toyota City, they waited for the orders to come in and built the cars ‘just in time’. The parts for the pre-order also arrived just as they were needed. On the basis of these and other efficiencies Toyota was able to compete, and eventually dominate the market.

Today, there are very few large-scale companies not using the Just in Time methodology.

And what does this have to do with prevention science and practice? First of all, nearly all evidence-based products are interventions, things done to change risks and boost resilience in children’s lives. There is certainly room for evidence-based processes to be made more efficient, for children to get the help they need more quickly.

Second, most evidence based programs would fail if they were rolled out on a large scale. If the developers were able to refine them to be more efficient without altering the underlying structure of the intervention, they could reach more children at less cost.

Third, evidence based programs are being placed into communities, schools and systems that are full of inefficient processes. Retooling the mechanism that starts with a family knocking on the door of children’s services for help and ends, often many weeks later, with little or no help being offered could save billions of dollars. Those funds would be better invested in interventions that work.

In science and the arts we have awards to remember people who changed the world. In industry, success is most often its own reward. Ohno surely changed the world but, except for those who are fascinated with mass production, his name is largely forgotten. It may well be the time to for it to be discovered by prevention scientists and public policy leaders.

Michael Little

Reference

Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production, Productivity Press, 1988